In an oblivious transfer (OT) protocol, a Sender with messages M 1 , . . . , M N and a Receiver with indices σ 1 , . . . , σ k ∈ [1, N ] interact in such a way that at the end the Receiver obtains M σ1 , . . . , M σ k without learning anything about the other messages and the Sender does not learn anything about σ 1 , . . . , σ k . In an adaptive protocol, the Receiver may obtain M σi−1 before deciding on σ i . Efficient adaptive OT protocols are interesting both as a building block for secure multiparty computation and for enabling oblivious searches on medical and patent databases.
Introduction
Oblivious transfer (OT) was introduced by Rabin [30] and generalized by Even, Goldreich and Lempel [19] and Brassard, Crépeau and Robert [8] . It is a two-party protocol, where a Sender with messages M 1 , . . . , M N and a Receiver with indices σ 1 , . . . , σ k ∈ [1, N ] interact in such a way that at the end the Receiver obtains M σ 1 , . . . , M σ k without learning anything about the other messages and the Sender does not learn anything about σ 1 , . . . , σ k . Naor and Pinkas were the first to consider an adaptive setting, OT N k×1 , where the Receiver may obtain M σ i−1 before deciding on σ i [27] . Efficient OT schemes are very important. OT computation [33, 20, 24] . OT N k×1 is a useful and interesting tool in its own right, enabling oblivious databases for applications such as medical record storage and patent searches [28] .
Developing efficient adaptive protocols appears to be a more difficult and involved process than in the non-adaptive case. Indeed, even finding the right security definition has proven challenging. Historically, many efficient OT constructions were analyzed under a "half-simulation" definition, where the Sender and Receiver's security are described by a combination of simulation and gamebased definitions. Naor and Pinkas [27] showed that schemes analyzed under this definition may admit practical attacks on the Receiver's privacy. To address this, Camenisch, Neven and shelat [10] and subsequently Green and Hohenberger [21] proposed efficient and fully-simulatable OT N k×1 protocols under bilinear assumptions. Each of these protocols achieve the optimal total communications cost of O(N + k) with reasonable constants. Unfortunately, the security proofs for these protocols employ adversarial rewinding, and thus do not imply security under concurrent execution.
Recently, Lindell [25] showed how to achieve efficient and fully-simulatable non-adaptive OT 2 1 under the DDH, N th residuosity and quadratic residuosity assumptions, as well as the assumption that homomorphic encryption exists. Simultaneously, Peikert, Vaikuntanathan and Waters [29] proposed several non-adaptive, but universally composable OT 2 1 protocols based on DDH, quadratic residuosity and lattice-based assumptions. While both of these valuable works add to our collective knowledge for non-adaptive OT, they do not shed much light on how to achieve efficient adaptive protocols. Indeed, Lindell points out that the adaptive case is considerably harder [25] .
The general framework used in [25, 29] (where the Receiver chooses the encryption keys) seems inherently at odds with allowing efficient adaptive schemes. Each transfer requires O(N ) work for the Sender, whereas this can be constant in our protocols. Even more alarming, it isn't clear how (without killing the efficiency and perhaps the UC security of [29] ) a Sender could convince the Receiver that he is not changing the database values with each request. This problem of ensuring a consistent database gets even worse when multiple Receivers are considered, as we do in Section 5.
Our Results. In this work, we take a different approach to constructing OT protocols, which allows them to be simultaneously efficient, adaptive, universally composable and globally consistent. We summarize what is known about OT N k×1 protocols in Figure 1 . Let us describe some highlights.
Universal Composability:
The Universal Composability framework [13] allows for the design of concurrent and composable cryptographic protocols, which are important properties in any practical deployment of an oblivious database. Canetti and Fischlin showed that OT cannot be UC-realized without additional trusted setup assumptions such as the existence of a Common Reference String (CRS) [15] . This is formally referred to as the F CRS -hybrid model, and is assumed by the constructions of Peikert et al.
[29] as well as those in this work. As in [29] , we work in a static corruption model.
Efficiency:
Our protocol is practical. For a database of N objects, the initialization phase requires O(N ) communication cost, and each transfer phase requires only constant cost, for reasonable constants. In contrast, simply repeating a OT N 1 scheme (such as [29] ) k times would require O(N ) communication cost for each transfer plus the additional work required for the Sender to convince the Receiver that he isn't changing the database values dynamically. Moreover, the message space of our protocol is a group element (so at least 160 bits), whereas the quadratic residuosity and lattice-based schemes of [29] have one-bit message spaces. We note, however, that the DDH-based scheme of [29] allows for longer messages.
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3. Global Consistency: In our constructions, the sender publishes some form of commitment to the database at the beginning of the protocol. When joint state is allowed (see Sections 2 and 5), then multiple receivers, all of whom start with the same commitment, can be sure that whenever their request on index i succeeds, they receive the same message M i as any other receiver. In other words, globally consistency ensures that a sender cannot return patent M i to Alice and a different patent M i = M i to Bob.
Model and Assumptions:
It seems undesirable to use random oracles for a primitive as fundamental as OT. Thus, we focus on protocols secure in the standard model. 1 Our construction can be implemented under the SXDH [31, 5, 2, 23], Decision Linear [5] , and q-Hidden LRSW assumptions (a non-interactive variant of the standard LRSW assumption [26, 1] , for which we give a generic group proof in Appendix C.)
By using only a q-based computational assumption and simple decisional assumptions, we improve over the (non-UC) adaptive OT of Camenisch et al. [10] , which used the (computational) q-Strong Diffie-Hellman and introduced a strong (decisional) q-Power Decisional DH requiring that in a bilinear setting e : G 1 × G 2 → G T with prime order q, given (g, g x , g x 2 , . . . , g x q , H) where g ← G 1 , x ← Z q and H ← G T , the vector (H x , H x 2 , . . . , H x q ) be indistinguishable from a random vector.
Intuition behind the Construction. Oblivious Transfer protocols can be roughly divided into two categories. Let's restrict our attention to non-adaptive OT N 1 for the moment. In approach (1), which is used by [30, 19, 25, 29] , the Receiver transmits a collection of specially-formed encryption keys to the Sender, who encrypts each message and returns the N ciphertexts to the Receiver. The protocol is secure provided that the encryption keys are formed such that a Receiver is able to decrypt at most one of the resulting ciphertexts. In approach (2), which is used by [10, 21] and this work, the Sender encrypts the message collection under keys of her own choosing, and-in some interactive protocol with the Receiver-helps to decrypt one ciphertext.
While both approaches can be used to implement adaptive OT, the first approach requires that the Sender generate a new set of ciphertexts at each transfer stage (for each receiver), requiring at least O(N · k) cost. Even worse, the Sender might be able to maliciously change the database from one transfer stage to another and to present different versions of the database to different receivers.
The latter approach is better suited for the adaptive case. A single database can be committed to and then each decryption can be performed in constant computational and communication cost, for a total O(N + k) cost. This approach is taken by the fully-simulatable protocols of [10] , which both use rewinding in their simulations to (1) simulate proofs and (2) extract knowledge. An appealing approach to achieving UC secure adaptive OT would be to modify the efficient standard-model protocol of Camenisch et al. [10] by simply replacing rewinding-based proofs with the non-interactive proof techniques of Groth and Sahai [23] . Unfortunately, this is non-trivial for two reasons. First, the Groth-Sahai techniques provide broad support for non-interactive, witness indistinguishable proofs of algebraic assertions in bilinear groups, but only provide noninteractive, zero-knowledge proofs for a restricted class of algebraic assertions. Unfortunately, the proof statements required by [10] fall outside of this class, and it does not seem easy to rectify this problem. Secondly, the protocol of [10] requires some form of extraction (e.g., extracting the chosen index from the adversarial Receiver or extracting the secret encryption keys from the adversarial Sender) for proofs containing elements of Z p ; unfortunately, Groth-Sahai proofs of knowledge are fextractable (but not fully extractable), where only some one-way function of the witness, f (w), can be extracted (e.g., g w ) and not the witness w itself. Dealing with this limitation would necessitate substantial changes to the CNS protocol.
Instead, our construction starts from scratch. While we follow the "assisted decryption" framework of the CNS protocol, we are able to do so without the need for strong q-based decisional assumptions. We instead base the security of the ciphertexts in our scheme on the more standard Decision Linear assumption [5] . Finally, since the Groth-Sahai proofs have not yet been shown to be either simulation-sound or UC in general, we develop techniques that permit UC simulation (even in the advanced case where multiple receivers interact with a single sender).
Definitions
Notation. By OT N k (resp., OT N k×1 ), we denote a non-adaptive (resp., adaptive) k-out-of-N oblivious transfer protocol. Let c ≈ denote computational indistinguishability, as defined in [13] .
Adaptive k-out-of-N Oblivious Transfer. OT N k×1 protocols consist of two phases: Initialization and Transfer. In the Initialization phase, the Sender commits to the input database M 1 , . . . , M N . Subsequently, the Sender and Receiver engage in up to k Transfers. During the i th Transfer, the Receiver adaptively selects a message index σ i ∈ [1, N ] and engages in a protocol such that it obtains M σ i (or ⊥ if the protocol fails) and nothing else, while the Sender learns nothing about σ i . The simulation-based nature of the security definition we use ensures that protocol failures must occur independently of the message index σ i chosen by the Receiver (capturing the strong selective-failure blindness property [10] .) Universally Composable Security. Here, as in [29] , we work in the standard UC framework with static corruptions, where all parties are modeled as p.p.t. interactive Turing machines. Security of protocols is defined by comparing the protocol execution to an ideal process for carrying out the desired task. More formally, there is an environment Z whose task is to distinguish between two worlds: ideal and real. In the ideal world, "dummy parties" (some of whom may be corrupted by the ideal adversary S) interact with an ideal functionality F. In the real world, parties (some of whom may be corrupted by the real world adversary A) interact with each other according to some protocol π. We refer to Canetti [13, 14] for a fuller description, as well as a definition of the ideal world ensemble IDEAL F ,S,Z and the real world ensemble EXEC π,A,Z . We use the established notion of a protocol π securely realizing an ideal functionality F as:
Upon receiving input (sid, crs) from party P , first verify that p ∈ P; else ignore the input. If there is no value r recorded, then choose and record r ← D. Finally send output (sid, crs, r) to P . Figure 2 : Ideal functionality for the common reference string [14] .
proceeds as follows, parameterized with integers N, and running with an oblivious transfer Sender S, a receiver R and an adversary S.
• Upon receiving a message (sid, sender, m 1 , . . . , m N ) from S, where each m i ∈ {0, 1} , store (m 1 , . . . , m N ).
• Upon receiving a message (sid, receiver, σ) from R, check if a (sid, sender, . . . ) message was previously received. If no such message was received, send nothing to R. Otherwise, send (sid, request) to S and receive the tuple (sid, b ∈ {0, 1}) in response. Pass (sid, b) to the adversary, and: Definition 2.1 Let F be a functionality. A protocol π is said to UC-realize F if for any adversary A, there exists a simulator S such that for all environments Z,
Canetti and Fischlin showed that OT cannot be UC-realized without a trusted setup assumption [15] . Thus, as in [16, 29] , we assume the existence of an honestly-generated Common Reference String (crs), and work in the so-called F CRS -hybrid model. The functionality is parameterized by a distribution D and a set P of recipients. For our purposes, P will include the OT Sender and Receiver only. Here the environment learns about the reference string from the adversary, and thus the simulator can set up a string with "trapdoor information", etc. Figure 2 describes the F CRS functionality and Figure 3 describes the F N ×1 OT functionality. We briefly mention that there are techniques for designing and analyzing multiple OT protocols which use a single reference string; i.e., a multi-session extension. One might worry that if multiple protocols now share some joint state, then they can no longer be analyzed separately and then composed later. Fortunately, this is addressed by universal composition with joint state (JUC) [17] and could be done in our case. A second issue with sharing the reference string is that we make no guarantee about the security of protocols which use the same reference string in ways other than those specified by the OT protocol, and here we explicitly assume that the crs is only available to certain parties. This is at odds with the notion that the crs is a "global" entity, however, there are strong impossibility results for UC-realizing OT in a setting where the crs is available to everyone (including the environment) and can no longer be crafted by the simulator. There are models, such as the augmented CRS functionality F ACRS [12] , which overcome these impossibility results, but we do not explore these advanced UC issues with respect to our OT construction in this work.
Preliminaries
Bilinear Groups. Let BMsetup be an algorithm that, on input 1 κ , outputs the parameters for a bilinear mapping as γ = (p, G 1 , G 2 , G T , e, g ∈ G 1 ,g ∈ G 2 ), where g generates G 1 andg generates G 2 , the groups G 1 , G 2 , G T each have prime order p, and e : , g,g) . The SXDH assumption states that the Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem is hard within both G 1 and G 2 .
Groups where SXDH holds is one of the three settings of the Groth-Sahai proof system [23] .
. For all p.p.t. adversaries Adv, the following probability is strictly less than 1/2 + 1/poly(κ):
The original DLIN assumption of Boneh, Boyen and Shacham [5] is set in symmetric groups; here we use a weaker asymmetric version.
adversaries Adv, the following probability is strictly less than 1/poly(κ):
Related formulations of the above assumption in an oracle-setting, where the x i values are chosen dynamically by Adv, are the LRSW assumption which was introduced by Lysyanskaya et al. [26] and the Strong LRSW assumption of Ateniese, Camenisch and de Medeiros [1] We eliminate the oracle and instead give q random tuples, which are also slightly changed. In Appendix C, we show that the above assumption admits a proof in Shoup's generic group model [32].
Groth-Sahai Proofs
The Groth-Sahai proof system [23] permits a variety of efficient non-interactive proofs of the satisfiability of one or more pairing product equations. For variables {X } 1...m ∈ G 1 , {Y} 1...n ∈ G 2 and constants {A} 1...n ∈ G 1 , {B} 1...m ∈ G 2 , a i,j ∈ Z p , and t T ∈ G T , these equations have the form:
Groth and Sahai show how to construct Witness Indistinguishable proof-of-knowledge of a satisfying witness to such an equation, in prime-order groups where the SXDH or Decision Linear assumptions hold. The proof system they describe can be composed over multiple equations involving the same variables. Additionally, they point out that in some special cases, their techniques can be strengthened to provide Zero Knowledge. Unlike the interactive proofs used in [10, 21] , the GrothSahai proofs do not use adversarial rewinding in their security analysis.
Groth-Sahai Commitments [23] . At the core of the Groth-Sahai system is a homomorphic commitment scheme to elements of G 1 or G 2 . 2 The public parameters for the commitment scheme can be generated in one of two ways. Method (1) leads to a perfectly-binding commitment scheme, while method (2) leads to a perfectly-hiding scheme. Note that the two parameter distributions are computationally indistinguishable under the SXDH assumption. When the GS commitment parameters are configured according to method (1), they are equivalent to an Elgamal encryption of a group element, and can be decrypted by a party that knows a trapdoor to the commitment parameters. When commitments are configured according to method (2), a "simulation" trapdoor can be used on random commitments to open them to any value g x (org x ) for known x.
The Proof System. We now describe the proof system at a high level, adopting some notation and exposition from [3] . For this description we will conceal many of the underlying details, though the reader can refer to [23, 3] for a more detailed explanation. The proof system contains the following (possibly probabilistic) polynomial time algorithms:
GSSetup(γ). On input γ ∈ BMsetup(1 κ ), outputs a string GS containing parameters for the proof system. This string embeds binding parameters for the G-S commitment scheme. GSProve (GS, S, W ). On input a statement S describing the equation, and a satisfying witness W ∈ {X } 1...m , {Y} 1...n , outputs a proof π. To formulate this proof, a commitmentĈ i is generated for each element in W . The proof embeds openings to the commitments in such a way that a prover can ascertain that S is verifiably satisfied, and yet the elements of W remain hidden. GSVerify(GS, π). Verifies the proof π (using the commitments and opening values) and outputs
Accept if π is valid, Reject otherwise. (For compactness of notation, we will specify that π embeds the statement S).
Above we describe the proof system in normal operation. Our security proofs additionally use:
GSExtractSetup(γ). Outputs GS (distributed identically to the output of GSSetup(γ)) and an extraction trapdoor td ext containing a trapdoor for the commitment scheme. This trapdoor permits an extraction of a valid witness from the commitments embedded within a proof. GSExtract(GS, td ext , π). Given a proof π and the extraction trapdoor, extracts X i or Y i from each commitmentĈ i , and outputs the witness W = {X } 1...M , Y} 1...N that satisfies the equations. GSSimulateSetup(γ). Outputs parameters GS that are computationally indistinguishable from the output of GSSetup(γ), as well as a simulation trapdoor td sim which consists of a simulation trapdoor for the commitment scheme. GSSimProve(GS , td sim , S). Given simulation parameters GS and trapdoor td sim , outputs a proof π of statement S that such that GSVerify(GS , π) = Accept. Note that this algorithm operates on certain restricted classes of statements (see below).
In the general case, Groth-Sahai proofs provide strong Witness Indistinguishability in groups where the SXDH assumption holds. However, in the special case where in all equations being simultaneously satisfied, the value t T = 1 (or t T can be decomposed in a specific way), then it is also possible to form proofs that meet a strong definition of composable Zero-Knowledge. We will further discuss the set of statements for which Zero-Knowledge proofs are possible below, and momentarily refer to this class as S ZK . We now discuss the security properties of the proof system:
Correctness. For honestly-generated GS and π, GSVerify(GS, π) will always output Accept. Extractability (Soundness). For (GS, td ext ) ∈ GSExtractSetup(γ) and some π (embedding a statement S): if GSVerify(GS, π) outputs Accept then with probability 1 the algorithm GSExtract(GS, td, π) extracts a witness W that satisfies S. Composable Witness Indistinguishability. We first require that the parameters generated by GSSimulateSetup(γ) be computationally indistinguishable from the parameters generated by GSSetup(γ). We additionally require that all p.p.t. adversaries A have advantage 0 in the following game. Hand A the parameters GS ← GSSimulateSetup(γ), and allow A to output (S, W 0 , W 1 ) where S is a statement and W 0 , W 1 are distinct satisfying witnesses. Select
We again require that the parameters generated by GSSimulateSetup(γ) be computationally indistinguishable from the parameters generated by GSSetup(γ). We additionally require that all p.p.t. adversaries A have advantage 0 in the following game. Generate (GS , td sim ) ← GSSimulateSetup(γ), and give GS to A. Allow A to output (S, w) where S ∈ S ZK and w is a satisfying witness. Let
Note that GS proofs can be defined over multiple pairing product equations. In this case, satisfiability implies knowledge of a witness for each statement. In our constructions, we will denote a GS proof statement using the notation of Camenisch and Stadler [11] . For instance, N IW I GS {(a 1 , a 2 ) :
2 , a 3 ) = 1} represents a non-interactive Witness Indistinguishable proof of knowledge, formed under parameters GS, of a witness W = a 1 , a 2 that satisfies both statements. All values not in enclosed within the initial ()'s are assumed to be known to the verifier. We will alternatively use the notation NIZK to denote a Zero-Knowledge proof.
Statements with Zero-Knowledge Proofs. While Groth and Sahai [23] generally accomplish Witness-Indistinguishable (WI) proofs, they note that certain classes of pairing-product statements admit Zero-Knowledge proofs as well. In order to prove a statement in Zero-Knowledge (as per the definition above), a simulator must be able to produce a simulated proof π without being given specific knowledge of a witness to the statement. Note that if the simulator can compute a valid witness by itself, then it is sufficient to simply use a WI proof. For instance, in the special case where t T = 1 for a pairing product equation, the simulator can always compute a satisfying witness by selecting each X i or Y i to be g 0 org 0 respectively.
Groth and Sahai further observe that more complex statements can be made Zero Knowledge by applying the simulation trapdoor for the Groth-Sahai commitment scheme. This trapdoor allows the simulator to open a random commitment to any g x org x (for known x), and can be applied such that the same commitment is opened differently for each equation within the statement. In some cases, we may need to re-write a statement in order to construct a ZK proof. For example, consider the proof N IW I GS {(a) : e(a, d) = e(g, h)} made on variable a and constants d, g, h. By adding a second variable b we obtain the equivalent N IZK statement:
Note that the equivalence holds by the property that b = g is the only valid solution to the revised equation. However, we can simulate the statement by opening the appropriate commitments such that a = b = g 0 in the first equation, while in the second equation b = g. We will use similar techniques to simulate the Zero-Knowledge proofs in our constructions.
Additional Tools
Modified CL Signatures. Our constructions use a weak variant of the Camenisch-Lysanskyaya signature scheme [9] , altered to operate on messages in G 1 . Whereas CL signatures rely on the interactive oracle LRSW assumption to achieve security against adaptive chosen-message attacks, in the context of our construction we will require only a non-interactive q-Hidden LRSW assumption to achieve a weaker property (unforgeability given a set of signatures on random messages).
. . ) and generators (g,g), select s, t $ ← Z p and setS ←g s ,T ←g t . Output vk = (γ, g,g,S,T ), and sk = (vk , s, t).
Note that the verification algorithm can be represented as a set of pairing product equations, and thus it is possible to prove knowledge of a pair (m, sig) using the GS proof system. To prove knowledge of m, sig, first select y 
The verifier checks both the proof and the fact that e(a 1 ,g) = e(g,ã 5 ).
Selective-message Secure Boneh-Boyen Signatures. Our constructions also make use of a weak signature scheme built from the Boneh-Boyen selective-ID IBE scheme [4] ( §4).
On input m ∈ G 1 and sig = (s 1 ,s 2 , s 3 ), verify that e(s 1 ,g)/e(mh,s 2 ) = e(g 1 ,g 2 ) and e(g,s 2 ) = e(s 3 ,g).
Protocol OTA OTA is parameterized by the algorithms (OTGenCRS, OTInitialize, OTRequest, OTRespond, OTComplete).
When S is activated with (sid, sender, M 1 , . . . , M N ):
1. S queries F CRS with (sid, S, R) and receives (sid, crs). R then queries F CRS with (sid, S, R) and receives (sid, crs).
, sends (sid, T ) to R and stores (sid, T, sk).
When R is activated with (sid, receiver, σ), and R has previously received (sid, T ) and (sid, crs):
, sends (sid, Q) to S and stores (sid, Q priv ). 2. S gets (sid, Q) from R, runs R ← OTRespond(crs, T, sk, Q), and sends (sid, R) to R. 3. R receives (sid, R) from S, and outputs (sid, OTComplete(crs, T, R, Q priv )).
a FCRS computes computes crs ← OTGenCRS(1 κ ). protocol, with details of each algorithm described in Section 4. We make no explicit mention of the value k, the total transfers permitted by the Sender, because our protocol does not depend on it. The Sender may choose to stop answering the Receiver's queries at any point, in which case OTRespond outputs "reject" and OTComplete accepts this as the message ⊥.
We can prove knowledge of a pair (m, sig) as follows. Select y
y , s 3 g y ). Outputs 2 , s 3 and the witness indistinguishable proof:
2 ) = e(h,s 2 )e(g 1 ,g 2 )} The verifier checks the proof and the fact that e(g,s 2 ) = e(s 3 ,g). Double-Trapdoor BBS Encryption. Our constructions also use a variant of the Boneh-BoyenShacham encryption scheme [5] with a double trapdoor for decryption. Details are in Appendix B.
A UC-secure OT Construction
Our adaptive oblivious transfer protocol, OT N k×1 , is described in Figure 4 , with each of the algorithms (OTGenCRS, OTInitialize, OTRequest, OTRespond, OTComplete) described below.
OTGenCRS(1 κ ). Given security parameter κ, generate parameters for a bilinear mapping
). (In the full version, we describe how this common reference string can be replaced by a common random string.)
OTInitialize(crs, m 1 , . . . , m N ). This algorithm is executed by the Sender. On input a collection of N messages and the crs, it outputs a commitment to the database, T , for publication to the Receiver, as well as a Sender secret key, sk. We treat messages as elements of G 1 , since there exist efficient mappings between strings in {0, 1} and elements in G 1 (e.g., [6, 1] ).
Parse crs to obtain GS
Each ciphertext C j above can be though of as a signcryption where it is the randomness for each ciphertext that is signed, rather than the plaintext itself. Each plaintext m j is encrypted under S's public key u 1 , u 2 , as well as a "key" g 1 , g 2 drawn from crs. This "double-trapdoor" encryption is necessary for the security proof of the OT scheme.
To verify the format of each ciphertext C j = (c 1 , . . . , c 5 , sig 1 , sig 2 , sig 3 ) in T , anyone can check that CLVerify vk 1 (c 1 , sig 1 ), CLVerify vk 2 (c 2 , sig 2 ), and BBVerify vk 3 (c 1 c 2 , sig 3 ) each succeed, and that e(c 1 ,g 1 ) = e(c 3 ,ũ 1 ) ∧ e(c 2 ,g 2 ) = e(c 4 ,ũ 2 ).
OTRequest(crs, T, σ). This algorithm is executed by a Receiver. On input T generated by the Sender, along with an item index σ, generates a query Q for transmission to the Sender.
1. Parse T as (pk , C 1 , . . . , C N ), and ensure that it is correctly formed (see above). If T is not correctly formed, abort the protocol. (This is only necessary on the first transfer.) 2. Parse crs to obtain (GS R ,h), and parse pk as (u 1 , u 2 ,ũ 1 ,ũ 2 , vk 1 , vk 2 , vk 3 ). Parse the σ th ciphertext C σ as (c 1 , . . . , c 5 ,
4. Use the Groth-Sahai techniques and reference string GS R to compute a Witness Indistinguishable proof π that the values d 1 , d 2 pertaining to the ciphertext C σ (which the Receiver wishes to have the Sender help him open) have the correct structure:
To explain what is happening in the statement of step (4), first observe that the signature proofs of knowledge ensure that the values c 1 , c 2 and the product (c 1 c 2 ) each correspond to a valid signature held by the Receiver. The remaining equations ensure that the values d 1 , d 2 correspond to "blinded" versions of the elements c 1 , c 2 . These checks guarantee that the witness used by the Receiver, and thus the decryption request being made, corresponds to one of the N ciphertexts published by the Sender.
OTRespond(crs, T, sk, Q). This algorithm is executed by the Sender. If the Sender does not wish to answer any more requests for the Receiver, then the Sender outputs the message "reject". Otherwise, the Sender processes the Receiver's request Q as:
1. Parse crs to obtain (GS R ,g,h), and parse T as (pk , C 1 , . . . , C N ), and sk as (
, and s ← a 1 · a 2 . 5. Use the Groth-Sahai techniques and reference string GS S to formulate a zero-knowledge proof 3 that the decryption value s is properly computed:
The third equation ensures that s = a 1 · a 2 , while the first two, since the values
) are known to both parties, ensure that a 1 = d
OTComplete(crs, T, R, Q priv ). This algorithm is executed by the Receiver. On input R generated by the Sender in response to a request Q, along with state Q priv , outputs a message m or ⊥. If R is the message "reject", then the Receiver outputs ⊥. Otherwise, the Receiver does:
1. Parse crs to obtain (GS S , h). Parse T as (pk , C 1 , . . . , C N ), R as (s, δ), and Q priv as (Q, σ, v 1 , v 2 ). 2. Verify proof δ using GS S . If verification fails, output ⊥. 
Efficiency Analysis
When the protocol in Figure 4 is implemented using the algorithms described above, we obtain a (k + 1/2)-round protocol with communications cost O(N + k), where k ≤ N . More concretely, the crs is comprised of 7 elements in G 1 and 7 elements of G 2 , the Sender's public key contains 5 elements in G 1 and 6 elements in G 2 . Each of the N ciphertexts in T requires 15 elements in G 1 and 3 elements in G 2 . Moreover, each item transfer involves transmission of 68 elements of G 1 and 38 elements of G 2 from Receiver to Sender, and then 20 elements of G 1 and 18 elements of G 2 from Sender to Receiver. The message space of our OT protocol is elements in G 1 , which will be sufficient for transferring a symmetric encryption key to unlock a file of arbitrary size. Let us now provide some intuition behind this proof, with the details contained in Appendix A. When either the Sender or the Receiver is corrupted, we wish to describe a simulator S such that it can interact with the ideal functionality F N ×1 OT (which we'll denote simply as F) and the environment Z appropriately; i.e., IDEAL F ,S,Z c ≈ EXEC OTA,A,Z . 3 We present a simplified version of this proof above. However, to permit simulation, we must add a third variableã3 =h and re-write the proof as N IZKGS S {(a1, a2,ã3) : e(a1,ũ1)e(d Simulating the case where only S is corrupted. We first consider the case where the realworld adversary A corrupts the Sender, and thus S must interact with F as the ideal Sender and with (an internal copy of) A as a real-world Receiver. Here S does the following:
Security Analysis
1. Ask A to begin an OT protocol, and set the crs for these two parties by running γ = (p,
, selecting random elements a 1 , a 2 ∈ Z p , and setting g
= h (and a corresponding relationship forg 1 ,g 2 ,h). Set crs = (γ, GS S , GS R , g 1 , g 2 , h,g 1 ,g 2 ,h ). When the parties query F CRS , return (sid, crs). 2. Obtain the database commitment T from A. Verify that T is well-formed, abort if not.
Otherwise, use a 1 , a 2 to decrypt each ciphertext
NIZK proof, then S tells F to fail the request by sending message (sid, 0). Otherwise, S sends the message (sid, 1) to F.
The indistinguishability argument here follows from the indistinguishability of the crs (which is identically distributed to a real crs), the perfect extraction of the messages m i 4 , and the Witness Indistinguishability of the GS proof π issued during each request phase, which guarantees that A (the corrupt Sender) cannot distinguish a request to decrypt C 1 from a request to decrypt any other valid ciphertext. Thus, S can adequately mimic its response pattern.
Simulating the case where only R is corrupted. Next, we consider the case where the real world adversary A corrupts the Receiver, and thus S must interact with F as the ideal Receiver and with (and internal copy of) A as real-world Receiver. This case requires that the q = N for the q-Hidden LRSW assumption. Here S does the following:
). When the parties query F CRS , return (sid, crs). 2. S must commit to a database of messages for A without knowing the messages m 1 , . . . , m N .
Thus, S simply commits to random junk messages, and sends the corresponding T to A. 3. When A makes a transfer request, S uses td ext to extract the witness W corresponding to A's decryption request from the NIWI proof. (This extraction is done via opening perfectlybinding commitments which are included in the WI proof and does not require any rewinding.) This witness includes the first two elements (c 1 , c 2 ) of the ciphertext that A is requesting to decrypt, and from these it is possible to determine the index σ of the ciphertext that A has requested to open. 4. S now sends (sid, R, σ ) to F to obtain the real m σ message. 4 Note that a ciphertext that passes the validity check can be represented as C = (u
r+s m, . . . ) for some r, s ∈ Zp, and when (g1, g2, h) have the relationship described above, decryption using a1, a2 always produces m.
5. Finally, S returns a response to A which opens C σ to m σ and then uses td sim to simulate an NIZK proof that this opening is correct. The NIZK proof here is designed in such a way that simulation is always possible and no rewinding is necessary.
The indistinguishability argument here follows from the indistinguishability of the crs (from a real crs), the indistinguishability of the "fake" database T , the ability to extract witnesses from the NIWI proofs, and the zero-knowledge property of "fake" NIZK proofs. In particular, note that the N -Hidden LRSW assumption ensures that any decryption request made by the receiver corresponds to a valid ciphertext from the database T (if A produces a proof π embedding invalid ciphertext values, we can use A to solve N -Hidden LRSW or the co-CDH problem, which is implied by N -Hidden LRSW). 5 Unlike the protocol of [10] we are able to base the semantic security of the ciphertexts on a standard decisional assumption (the Decision Linear assumption). This is possible because the full ciphertext can be constructed using only the DLIN input (see the note on Ciphertext security below). Notice that S is never both simulating and extracting via the same (subsection of the) common reference string; indeed, we do not require that the proofs be simulation-sound.
Simulating the case where both S and R are corrupted. In the case where both the Receiver and Sender are corrupted, S knows the inputs to S and R and can simulate a protocol execution by generating the real messages exchanged between the two parties.
Simulating the case where neither party is corrupted. When S receives messages of the form (sid, b i ) indicating that transfers have occurred, S generates a simulated transcript between the honest S and R. In this case, S runs the protocol as specified, using as S's input the random database (m 1 , . . . ,m N ), and (for each transfer), R's input σ = 1. If in the i th transfer b i = 0 then S's responds with an invalid R (the empty string). Else, S returns a valid response as in the protocol.
Ciphertext security. We briefly elaborate on the security of the ciphertexts in our scheme. To prove security when Receiver is corrupted, we must show that a ciphertext vector encrypting random messages is indistinguishable from a vector encrypting the real message database. We argue that this is the case under the Decision Linear assumption. Let D = (g,g, f,f , h,h, g a , f b , z d ) be a candidate Decision Linear tuple. We consider a simulation that behaves as follows:
1. Set u 1 = g, u 2 = f,ũ 1 =g,ũ 2 =f . Select random y 1 , y 2 ∈ Z p , and set g 1 = u
2 (and similarly forg 1 ,g 2 ). Fix crs ← (γ, GS S , GS R , g 1 , g 2 , h,g 1 ,g 2 ,h). 2. Generate (vk 1 , sk 1 ), (vk 2 , sk 2 ), (vk 3 , sk 3 ) as in normal operation. Set pk = (u 1 , u 2 ,ũ 1 ,ũ 2 , vk 1 , vk 2 , vk 3 ). 3. For i = 1 to N , choose fresh random s, t 1 , t 2 ∈ Z p and set c 1 = g as g st 1 , c 2 = f bs f st 2 . Set C i :
where sig 1 , sig 2 , sig 3 are generated normally using the appropriate secret keys. 4. Set T ← (pk , C 1 , . . . , C N ). 5. The simulation answers requests from the malicious Receiver by extracting from its proof and simulating correct responses (as described above.)
Note that in the above, if z d = h a+b , then the above simulation perfectly encrypts (m 1 , . . . , m N ). However, when z d is a random element of G 1 , then the ciphertexts correspond to encryptions of random elements in G 1 . Now, suppose for the sake of contradiction, that there exists an environment Z who can distinguish case one from case two with non-negligible probability . Then, it is easy to see that we can use Z to decide Decision Linear.
Sampling from a Common Random String. We briefly note that by the same arguments used above, the Reference String used in our construction can be replaced with a Common Random String. Note that crs embeds (γ, GS S , GS R , g 1 , g 2 , h,g 1 ,g 2 ,h), for GS R , GS S ∈ GSSetup(γ) and
Each set of Groth-Sahai commitment parameters embeds a tuple in G 1 (resp. G 2 ). When GSSetup is used, the parameters are generated such that the parameters are a DDH tuple in the respective group, and when GSSimulateSetup is used, they are uniformly random. Under SXDH, the latter distribution is indistinguishable from the correct one, and thus we may sample the components of GS S , GS R uniformly. Since the parameters γ can be sampled from a random string [22] , then all elements of crs can therefore be derived from a uniformly random string when a source of common randomness is available.
On Multiple Receivers
OT is traditionally described as a two-party protocol between a Sender and Receiver. We presented our main construction in this setting. However, since we are motivated by the application of OT to database systems, we would also like to support applications where multiple users share a single database. Naively this can be accomplished by requiring the database to run separate OT protocol instances with each user. However, this approach can be quite inefficient, and moreover does not ensure consistency in the database viewed by individual Receivers. Consider a strengthening of the security definition of F N ×1 OT (in Figure 3) to include the additional requirement that all Receivers "view" the same database, i.e., the database owner cannot selectively alter the messages in the database when interacting with different receivers -on query σ from any receiver, he must return a value in {m σ , ⊥}. Fortunately, consistency is easy and inexpensive to achieve in our construction -simply alter F D,P CRS to return the same values (g 1 , g 2 , h) as part of the crs to all receivers and have the Sender publish one database commitment T to everyone, handling joint state via [17] . Intuitively, this captures consistency because the simulator can set the values (g 1 , g 2 , h) and then trapdoor decrypt all messages in T (see Appendix B). Given the soundness of the GS proofs, all of the Sender's responses to any Receiver must be consistent with T , even if the other parts of their common reference strings are distinct. Note that it is not at all clear how consistency can be achieved efficiently even in the non-adaptive setting using prior UC results [29] , since there each Receiver provides her own encryption key for the Sender to bundle the messages in. 
A Proof of Theorem 4.1
Notation: Let ν i (·) denote a negligible function where for every polynomial p(·), there exists an N such that for all integers n > N , it holds that ν i (n) < 1/p(n).
Proof. Let A be a static adversary that interacts with parties S, R running protocol OTA parameterized with the algorithms of section 4. We construct an adversary S for the ideal functionality F N ×1
OT . S begins by invoking a copy of A and running a simulated interaction with the environment Z and the parties running the protocol. S proceeds as follows.
Simulating the communication with Z. Every input value that S receives from Z is written into the adversary A's input tape. Similarly, every output value written by A on its output tape is copied to S's own output tape (to be read by S's environment Z).
Simulating the case where only R is corrupted. Let γ ← BMsetup(1 κ ), then compute (GS S , td sim ) ← GSSimulateSetup(γ) and (GS R , td ext ) ← GSExtractSetup(γ). Generate the remaining elements of crs normally, and set crs ← (γ, GS S , GS R , g 1 , g 2 , h,g 1 ,g 2 ,h). When the parties query F CRS , return (sid, crs). Otherwise, let σ be the index of the matching ciphertext: S sends (sid, receiver, σ ) to
S initiates the communication with
outputs (sid, m σ ) for m σ = ⊥, S formulates the response s = (c 5 ω 3 ω 4 )/m σ andusing the simulation trapdoor td sim -simulates the zero-knowledge proof δ indicating that s is correctly formed according to the statement defined in the OTRespond algorithm (see Lemma A.7 for details on simulating this proof). S then sends R ← (s, δ ) to A as if from S. S repeats this process for each request received from A.
Simulating the case where only S is corrupted. Our simulation proceeds as follows. Let γ ← BMsetup(1 κ ), then compute GS S ← GSSetup(γ) and GS R ← GSSetup(γ). Select g 1 , g 2 , h,g 1 ,g 2 ,h such that g
2 =h) for (y 1 , y 2 ) known to the simulator. Set crs ← (γ, GS S , GS R , g 1 , g 2 , h,g 1 ,g 2 ,h). When the parties query F CRS , return (sid, crs).
S activates A and receives the message (sid, T ) that would be A's first move in a real execution with R. S verifies that T is correctly-structured, using the public check described in §4. OT . Simulating the case where neither party is corrupted. When S receives k messages of the form (sid, b i ) indicating that transfers have occurred, S generates a simulated transcript between the honest S and R. In this case, S runs the protocol as specified, using as S's input the random database (m 1 , . . . ,m N ), and (for each transfer), R's input σ = 1. If in the i th transfer b i = 0 then S's responds with an invalid R (the empty string). Else, S returns a valid response as in the protocol.
Simulating the case where both parties are corrupted. In this case S knows the inputs to S and R and can simulate a protocol execution by generating the real messages exchanged between the two parties.
We now address the environment's ability to distinguish the ideal execution from the real protocol execution. This is shown via the following claims. Proof. Consider the simulation described above. We will begin with the real-world protocol execution, where R interacts with an honest S that knows the message database. We will then show via a series of hybrids that the real execution transcript is computationally indistinguishable from the simulated transcript. For notational convenience, we define Pr [ Game i ] as the probability that environment Z distinguishes the transcript of Game i from that of the real execution. We now describe the cases:
Game 0. This is the real-world protocol execution, where R interacts with an honest S running protocol OTA on message database (m 1 , . . . , m N ). Clearly Pr [ Game 0 ] = 0.
Game 1 (Parameter switching). This execution proceeds as above, except that we compute (GS S , td sim ) ∈ GSSimulateSetup(γ), (GS R , td ext ) ∈ GSExtractSetup(γ), and substitute GS S , GS R in place of the honestly-generated parameters GS S , GS R (td sim , td ext are not revealed). When the parties query F CRS , return crs = (γ, GS S , GS R , g 1 , g 2 , h,g 1 ,g 2 ,h). Note that if the SXDH assumption holds in
Game 2 (Extracting R's selections). This execution proceeds as above, except that for transfer phase i = 1 to k, we compute a candidate for R's selection σ i by extracting from its PoK π. Parse R's i th request (sid, Q i ) to obtain (d 1 , d 2 , π) and (provided that π is valid) run GSExtract(crs, td ext , π) to extract a satisfying witness W = (ω 1 , ω 2 , ω 3 , ω 4 , . . . ). Parse T as (pk , C 1 , . . . , C N ), and for each ciphertext C i = (c 1 , . . . , c 9 ) determine whether (ω 1 , ω 2 ) = (c 1 , c 2 ). Let σ i be the index of the matching ciphertext. If no matching ciphertext is found (or multiple ciphertexts match), then output Extract-Fail to Z and send no further messages to R. By Lemma A.6, this event will occur with negligible probability under the N -Hidden LRSW assumption; thus |Pr [
Game 3 (Simulating S's responses). This execution proceeds as above, except that we will formulate each of S's transfer responses independently of sk. We parse C σ i to obtain (c 1 , . . . , c 5 ) and compute s = (c 5 ω 3 ω 4 )/m σ i . Let S be the statement proved by the Sender during the OTRespond algorithm: we compute a simulated PoK δ ← GSSimProve(GS S , td sim , S) and set R ← (s , δ ). Note that in order to simulate a response during transfer i, it is only necessary to know the subset of messages, (m σ 1 , . . . , m σ i ). By Lemma A.7, the transcript including these responses is computationally indistinguishable from the distribution with valid PoKs. Thus |Pr [
Game 4 (Substituting the ciphertexts). This execution proceeds as above, except that we replace S's first message with (sid, T ) where T ∈ OTInitialize(crs,m 1 , . . . ,m N ) for m 1 , . . . ,m N $ ← G 1 . For i = 1 to k, we also modify the i th transfer phase such that S's response is (sid, R i ) for R i = (s , δ ) computed as in Game 3, except that we must now compute the PoK δ on a possibly invalid statement S. By Lemma A.8, the hardness of the Decision Linear problem implies that the distribution of messages is indistinguishable from the real execution, even though s may be incorrectly formed with respect to S. Thus
Notice that the distribution produced in Game 4 is identical to that of our simulation. By summation, we have that Pr Proof. Consider the simulation described above. Again we begin with the real-world protocol execution, where S interacts with an honest R that chooses messages according to an arbitrary selection strategy Σ. We then show via a series of hybrids that the real execution transcript is computationally indistinguishable from the simulated transcript.
Game 0. This is the real-world protocol execution, where S interacts with an honest R running protocol OTA using selection strategy Σ. Clearly Pr [ Game 0 ] = 0.
Game 1 (Parameter generation). This execution proceeds as above, except that we select elements of crs such that g x 1 = g y 2 = h (andg x 1 =g y 2 =h) for known (x, y). When the parties query F CRS , return crs = (γ, GS S , GS R , g 1 , g 2 , h,g 1 , g 2 , h). Note that the distribution of crs is identical to the normal distribution. Thus |Pr [ (c 1 , c 2 , h v 1 , h v 2 , sig 1 , sig 2 , sig 3 ) that satisfies the pairing product equation S π . By the WitnessIndistinguishability property of the Groth-Sahai proof system, the value Q 1 is indistinguishable from a request formed on a different
Game 2 has an identical distribution to our simulation, and Pr [ Game 2 ] ≤ ν 1 (κ). It remains to show that the in our simulation the distribution of messages obtained by an ideal R interacting with F N ×1 OT are identical to the messages recovered by an honest R running the protocol directly with S. This implies that for every set of indices (σ 1 , . . . , σ k ) the plaintexts (m σ 1 , . . . , m σ k ) obtained by S-which decrypts the ciphertexts in T with the trapdoor (x, y)-are identical to the messages recovered by an honest R running the protocol with S.
S's initial output T embeds pk = (u 1 , u 2 , . . . ). Let (a, b) be S's secret key, which is implicitly defined by u a 1 = u b 2 = h. We observe that if T passes the validity check run by honest R, then each ciphertext C i can be expressed as (u r
2 ) = h r+s . Let us consider an honest R that requests index i from S. It selects v 1 , v 2 ∈ Z p and sets
. Let R = (s, δ) be the response from S. If PoK δ verifies, then (by the soundness property of the proof system) with all but negligible probability s = d a 1 d b 2 and the honest R computes the message as (
. This is identical to the decryption obtained by S using the trapdoor (x, y), which produces h s+r /(g rx 1 g We omit a formal proof of this claim, but note that it re-uses techniques identical to those of the previous claims. Specifically, we replace the Sender's initial message T with a commitment to a random database, and show that this random database is indistinguishable from a real database under the Decision Linear assumption (as in Claim A.1). We then argue that by the WitnessIndistinguishability property of the Groth-Sahai proof system, the extractions on message index 1 are indistinguishable from extractions on other message indices (as in Claim A.2). We omit a formal proof of this claim.
Lemma A.5 Under the SXDH assumption, the parameters generated by GSSetup (and GSExtractSetup) are computationally indistinguishable from those produced by GSSimulateSetup.
We refer the reader to the work of Groth and Sahai [23] for a proof of this theorem.
Lemma A.6 Under the N -Hidden LRSW and co-CDH 6 assumptions, the probability that S outputs Extract-Fail in Game 3 is negligible.
Proof sketch. Let T = (pk , C 1 , . . . , C N ) be honestly-generated as in Game 3. Consider A's request (sid, Q i ) at transfer i ∈ [1, k], and parse Q i as (d 1 , d 2 , π) where π is a PoK (of the statement described in the definition of OTRequest) using parameters GS R . Note that the simulator knows the trapdoor td ext corresponding to GS R , and can therefore extract a satisfying witness W = (ω 1 , ω 2 , . . . ) ← GSExtract(GS R , td ext , π) (in the general case, extraction succeeds with probability ≥ 1 − ν(κ) by the Soundess property of the Groth-Sahai proof system). 7 Since extraction fails with at most negligible probability, then if S outputs Extract-Fail with non-negligible probability, then it must be that that for j ∈ [1, N ] there is either (a) no single ciphertext C j = (c j,1 , . . . , c j,5 , . . . ) such that (ω 1 , ω 2 ) = (c j,1 , c j,2 ), or (b) there are multiple ciphertexts for which the relation holds.
We can easily dispose of case (b): since T is honestly generated, then for each ciphertext (c j,1 , . . . , c j,5 , sig 1 , sig 2 , sig 3 ) , the values c j,1 , c j,2 are uniformly distributed in G 1 . Therefore, the probability is negligible that any two distinct ciphertexts are identical in the first two elements. This it remains only to address case (a) where there is no ciphertext C j such that (c j,1 , c j,2 ) = (ω 1 , ω 2 ). This condition can be further divided into two sub-cases:
1. Where for i = j there exists some pair of ciphertexts C i , C j such that ω 1 = c i,1 and ω 2 = c j,2 . 2. Where there is no pair of ciphertexts such that the above condition holds, i.e., either ω 1 or ω 2 is not contained within any ciphertext in T .
We now show that if A outputs a PoK satisfying condition (1) then we can use its response to solve the co-CDH problem, and if A satisfies condition (2) we can solve N -Hidden LRSW. We now describe each of the two simulations:
Case 1: co-CDH. We consider the case where A produces (ω 1 , ω 2 ) = (c i,1 , c j,2 ) for i = j, and show that an A that produces such a query can be used to solve the Computational co-Diffie-Hellman problem in G 1 , G 2 , i.e., given (g, g a , g b ,g,g a ,g b ) for a, b ∈ R Z p , solve for g ab . The intuition behind this argument is that the final component sig 3 is a signature on the product (c 1 c 2 ). This signature is built from the Boneh-Boyen selective-ID IBE scheme from [4] ( §4), and a forger of this scheme can be used to solve the co-CDH problem in asymmetric bilinear groups. 8 Our reduction is based on the one given by Boneh and Boyen, although we reduce to co-CDH. Since the N -Hidden LRSW assumption implies the hardness of co-CDH, we are not introducing a new assumption.
Given an input (g, g a , g b ,g,g a ,g b ) to the co-CDH problem: select random values u, v, w, y
Randomly select two ciphertext indices i * , j * such that i * = j * . Now for i = 1 to N , choose r i , s i , y i uniformly from Z p with the restriction that (r i * + us
, and set
Construct the i th ciphertext as:
In fact, for parameters GS R ∈ GSExtractSetup(), Groth-Sahai proofs are perfectly extractable [23] . 8 Note that a selective-ID IBE scheme implies a secure signature scheme only if the message space is polynomial in κ. Since in this case A succeeds by proving knowledge of a signature on message (ci,1cj,2) for some i = j, we have naturally restricted the total number of valid messages to N 2 − N .
(Note that the sig 3 has the correct distribution. Letŷ i = y i − b/(z i − v), and re-write (g b )
=gŷ i (and similarly for the third element). We can then express the first element Observe that in case (2) the soundness of the G-S proof system ensures that for some y we can represent (s 1 ,s 2 , s 3 ) = ((g a ) v h) y g ab ,g y , g y ). By substitution we obtain ((g a ) v (g a ) −v g w ) y g ab ,g y , g y ) = (g wy g ab ,g y , g y ), and thus s 1 /s w 3 = g ab . In this case, we can obtain the value g ab and output a correct solution to the co-CDH problem.
Note that the distribution of the messages sent to A is identical to that of the real attack, and are independent of i * , j * in A's view. Therefore, if A produces (ω 1 , ω 2 ) = (c i ,1 , c j ,2 ) for i = j with some non-negligible probability , then the approach above solves co-CDH with probability approximately N 2 −N , i.e., the probability that that (i , j ) = (i * , j * ).
Case 2: N -Hidden LRSW. In the case where either ω 1 or ω 2 is not contained within any ciphertext in T , then we will construct a solver for the N -Hidden LRSW problem. Our simulation proceeds as follows: given the N -Hidden LRSW instance (g,g, S, T, {b 1 , b p for the OT scheme and select u 1 , u 2 , u 1 , u 2 , h,h such that u 1 = g,ũ 1 =g, u
2 =h. Select values (g 1 , g 2 ,g 1 ,g 2 ) for crs such that g 1 = u t 1 for random t ∈ Z p , and g 2 is a random element. Generate (vk 2 , sk 2 ), (vk 3 , sk 3 ) as in the normal scheme, and set vk 1 = (γ, g,g, S, T ). To compute each ciphertext, set
a j t j ,b j ) and compute sig 2 , sig 3 normally. Select a random y j ∈ Z p and set C j ← (g a j , u
Strategy 2. Similar to the previous strategy, but formulate vk 2 and embed g a j in the second position of C j .
Observe that since the values a 1 , . . . , a N from the N -Hidden LRSW instance are uniformly distributed, then T has the correct distribution. Next, answer A's queries using the key sk , extracting a witness W = (ω 1 , ω 2 , . . . ) from the proof π. Note that from the witness W it is possible to obtain the full value of sig 1 . If ever A outputs a PoK π such that for Strategy s ∈ {1, 2} the extracted witness ω s does not match any c j,s ∈ C j , then extract the witness values for the proof of signature s-and output these as a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 ,ã 5 . Otherwise abort. This tuple represents a valid solution to the N -Hidden LRSW problem. Since all values are correctly distributed and s is outside of A's view, then we select the correct strategy with probability 1/2.
To conclude our sketch, note that we have covered all cases where event Extract-Fail can occur. Thus if the event occurs with probability non-negligible in κ then we have an algorithm that solves N -Hidden LRSW or CDH with non-negligible probability.
2
Lemma A.7 Replacing S's honestly-generated responses (as in Game 2) with simulated responses (as in Game 3) results in a simulation that is computationally indistinguishable from that of Game 2.
Proof sketch. Consider a transcript where each response (sid, R) is replaced with a simulated response (sid, R ). Let R = (s, δ) be the honestly-generated response, and let R = (s , δ ) be the simulated response. To complete our argument, we must show that for any given reponse: (1) with probability at most ν(κ), the value s = s , and (2) the PoK δ c ≈ δ . This must hold for all A, Z. Recall that pk embeds u 1 , u 2 such that u
A initiates the transfer by sending a message (sid, Q) containing the values (d 1 , d 2 , π). Using the extraction algorithm, we obtain a witness W = (ω 1 , ω 2 , ω 3 , ω 4 , . . . ) to the statement S π . Note that a correctlyformed response will have the form s = (d
2 ), and for C σ = (c 1 , . . . , c 5 , . . . ) a simulated response has the form s = (c 5 ω 3 ω 4 )/m σ , which we expand to s = (c
We omit a detailed expansion, but observe that by the statement S π it holds that d 1 = c 1 h v 1 /x 1 and d 2 = c 2 h v 2 /x 2 and thus our simulated s is identical to the correct response s.
Paraphrasing the composable zero-knowledge property of the Groth-Sahai proof system, when (GS S , td sim ) ∈ GSSimulateSetup() we can simulate a PoK δ ← GSSimProve(GS S , S δ ) such that no adversary can distinguish δ from a valid PoK. It is easy to show that we can simulate the statement S δ . Recall that the δ is defined as:
To simulate the proof, we must select commitments to represent a 1 , a 2 ,ã 3 , and we then compute opening values such that each statement is satisfied. Note that using the simulation trapdoor td sim we may open the commitment differently in each statement. To simulate a proof δ , set a 1 = a 2 = a 3 = h 0 and generate commitments to each value. In the first three statements, we open the third commitment to h 0 . In the final statement, we use the simulation trapdoor to open the third commitment to h 1 . Thus, all statements are satisfied. 2
Lemma A.8 Let m 1 , . . . , m N ∈ G 1 be any message database, andm 1 , . . . ,m N ∈ R G 1 be a set of random messages. Also let all of S's responses be computed as in Game 3. Under the Decision Linear assumption, no environment Z will distinguish the transcript where T = OTInitialize(crs, m 1 , . . . , m N ) from the transcript where T = OTInitialize(crs,m 1 , . . . ,m N ) (except with negligible probability).
Proof sketch. Let D = (g,g, f,f , h,h, g a , f b , z d ) be a candidate Decision Linear tuple. Next, consider a simulation that behaves as follows:
2 (and similarly forg 1 ,g 2 ). Fix crs ← (γ, GS S , GS R , g 1 , g 2 , h,g 1 ,g 2 ,h ). 2. Generate (vk 1 , sk 1 ), (vk 2 , sk 2 ), (vk 3 , sk 3 ) as in normal operation. Set pk = (u 1 , u 2 ,ũ 1 ,ũ 2 , vk 1 , vk 2 , vk 3 ) . 3. For i = 1 to N , choose fresh random s, t 1 , t 2 ∈ Z p and set c 1 = g as g st 1 , c 2 = f bs f st 2 . Set C i :
where sig 1 , sig 2 , sig 3 are generated normally using the appropriate secret keys. 4. Set T ← (pk , C 1 , . . . , C N ). 5. The simulation proceeds as in Game 3 at answer transfer requests.
Note that in the above, if z d = h a+b , then the above simulation perfectly encrypts (m 1 , . . . , m N ). However, when z d is a random element of G 1 , then the ciphertexts correspond to encryptions of random elements in G 1 . Now, suppose for the sake of contradiction, that there exists a Z who can distinguish case one from case two with non-negligible probability . Then, it is easy to see that we can use Z to decide Decision Linear. 
B Double-Trapdoor BBS Encryption
In Section 4, we make sure of a ciphertext which is based on the prior work of Boneh, Boyen, and Shacham [5] and has some interesting properties which are necessary for our simulation. In our OT constructions, we need an encryption scheme with a "double-trapdoor" (so that both the simulator in charge of the crs and the sender in charge of the pk can extract the messages of the ciphertext.) Boneh, Boyen and Shacham [5] describe a semantically-secure encryption scheme based on the Decision Linear (DLIN) assumption. We extend their scheme into a two-key (double-trapdoor) encryption scheme with a public consistency check. In this system, we can encrypt a message under two distinct public keys pk 1 , pk 2 , such that either of the corresponding secret keys sk 1 , sk 2 will decrypt the ciphertext. For every well-formed ciphertext, it must be the case that decryption will produce the same message regardless of which secret key is used. To satisfy this requirement, we also define a publicly-computable check for ciphertext well-formedness (i.e., the check does not require knowledge of either secret key).
Let
. Define global parameters h,h such that e(g,h) = e(g, h), and for 4 ). Note that the structure of a ciphertext can be verified using the bilinear map, by checking that e(c 1 ,ũ 2 ) = e(u 1 ,c 3 ) ∧ e(c 2 ,ṽ 2 ) = e(v 1 ,c 4 ) It is straightforward to show that the scheme above is semanticallysecure under the DLIN assumption.
C Generic Group Proof of Hidden LRSW Assumption
We provide evidence to that the q-Hidden LRSW assumption may be hard. In the generic group model, elements of the bilinear groups G 1 , G 2 , and G T are encoded as unique random strings. Thus, the adversary cannot directly test any property other than equality. Oracles are assumed to perform operations between group elements, such as performing the group operations in G 1 , G 2 , and G T . The opaque encoding of the elements of G 1 is defined as the function ξ 1 : Z p → {0, 1} * , which maps all a ∈ Z p to the string representation ξ 1 (a) of g a ∈ G 1 . Likewise, we have ξ 2 : Z p → {0, 1} * for G 2 and ξ T : Z p → {0, 1} * for G T . The adversary Adv communicates with the oracles using the ξ-representations of the group elements only. Theorem C.1 (Hidden LRSW is Hard in Generic Groups) Let Adv be an algorithm that solves the q-Hidden LRSW problem in the generic group model. Let q G be the number of queries Adv makes to the oracles computing the group action and pairing. If ξ 1 , ξ 2 , ξ T are chosen at random, then the probability that Adv(p,
for some A, X where A = 0, X = 0 and X ∈ {X i }, is bounded by
Proof. Consider an algorithm B that interacts with Adv in the following game. B maintains three lists of pairs
, such that, at step τ in the game, we have τ 1 + τ 2 + τ T = τ + 4 + 6q. Let the F 1,i , F 2,i and F T,i be multivariate polynomials in Z p [S, T, A i , X i ]. The ξ 1,i , ξ 2,i , and ξ T,i are set to unique random strings in {0, 1} * . We start the Hidden LRSW game at step τ = 0 with τ 1 = 1 + 5q, τ 2 = 3 + q, and τ T = 0. These correspond to the polynomials F 1,0 = F 2,0 = 1, F 2,1 = S, F 2,2 = T , F 1,1 = X 1 , F 1,2 = A 1 , F 2,3 = A 1 , F 1,3 = A 1 X 1 , F 1,4 = A 1 X 1 T and F 1,5 = A 1 (S + ST X 1 ), etc.
B begins the game with Adv by providing it with the random strings ξ 1,0 , . . . , ξ 1,5q , ξ 2,0 , . . . , ξ 2,q+2 . Now, we describe the oracles Adv may query.
Group action: Adv inputs two group elements ξ 1,i and ξ 1,j , where 0 ≤ i, j < τ 1 , and a request to multiply/divide. B sets F 1,τ 1 ← F 1,i ± F 1,j . If F 1,τ 1 = F 1,u for some u ∈ {0, . . . , τ 1 − 1}, then B sets ξ 1,τ 1 = ξ 1,u ; otherwise, it sets ξ 1,τ 1 to a random string in {0, 1} * \ {ξ 1,0 , . . . , ξ 1,τ 1 −1 }. Finally, B returns ξ 1,τ 1 to Adv, adds (F 1,τ 1 , ξ 1,τ 1 ) to L 1 , and increments τ 1 . Group actions for G 2 and G T are handled the same way.
Pairing: Adv inputs two group elements ξ 1,i and ξ 2,j , where 0 ≤ i < τ 1 and 0 ≤ j < τ 2 . B sets F T,τ T ← F 1,i · F 2,j . If F T,τ T = F T,u for some u ∈ {0, . . . , τ T − 1}, then B sets ξ T,τ T = ξ T,u ; otherwise, it sets ξ T,τ T to a random string in {0, 1} * \ {ξ T,0 , . . . , ξ T,τ T −1 }. Finally, B returns ξ T,τ T to Adv, adds (F T,τ T , ξ T,τ T ) to L T , and increments τ T .
We assume SXDH holds in (G 1 , G 2 , G T ) and therefore no ismorphism oracles exist. Eventually Adv stops and outputs a tuple of elements (ξ 1,a , ξ 1,b , ξ 2,f , ξ 1,c , ξ 1,d , ξ 1,e ), where 0 ≤ a, b, c, d, e < τ 1 and 0 ≤ f < τ 2 .
Analysis of Adv's Output. We now argue that it is impossible for Adv's output to always be correct. Each output polynomial must be some linear combination of polynomials corresponding to elements available to Adv in the respective groups. Consider the polynomials F 1,e and F 2,f . F 1,e := e 0 + e 1,i X i + e 2,i A i + e 3,i A i X i + e 4,i A i X i T + e 5,i A i (S + ST X i ) (1)
where a i A i is shorthand for q i=1 a i A i . For Adv's answer to be correct, we know their relationship must be, for some X: P := F 1,e − F 2,f (S + ST X) ≡ 0 mod p.
By substituting in equations 1 and 2, we get: Looking at the unique terms of this polynomial, we can immediately see that for P ≡ 0, it must be the case that for all i: e 0 = 0 , e 1,i = 0 , e 2,i = 0 , e 3,i = 0 , e 4,i = 0, f 0 = 0 , f 1 = 0 , f 2 = 0 Thus, we are left with P = e 5,i A i (S + ST X i ) − f 3,i A i (S + ST X). Since F 2,f = 0, we know that f 3,i = 0 (for at least one i) and thus e 5,j = 0 (for at least one j). It is easy to see that e 5,j cannot be non-zero for more than one value, since it will not be possible to cancel both corresponding terms. Thus, the only resolution is for X = X j , which is a contradiction. We conclude that Adv's success depends solely on his luck when the variables are instantiated.
Analysis of B's Simulation. At this point B chooses random values to instantiate the variables s, t, x i , a i ∈ Z p . We know that the chance of choosing a random assignment that hits the root of any given polynomial is bounded from above by the Schwartz-Zippel theorem by the degree of the polynomial divided by p. The maximum total degree of any polynomial here is 5. Taking all pairs of polynomials into consideration, we can bound the probability that a collision causes B's simulation to fail as ≤ In this section we describe a second adaptive oblivious transfer construction, using an alternative set of assumptions in the symmetric bilinear map setting. The security of this second scheme is based on the following hardness assumptions:
Uniform q-Hidden Strong Diffie-Hellman (q-HSDH) [7, 3] : Let BMsetup(1 κ ) → (p, G, G T , e, g) = γ. For all p.p.t. adversaries Adv, the following probability is strictly less than 1/poly(κ):
Pr[h Boyen and Waters did not specify the distribution for sampling the c i values in q-HSDH [7] . Following Belenkiy et al. [3] , we explicitly require that they be sampled uniformly from Z p . 
D.2 Efficiency Analysis
When the protocol in Figure 4 is implemented using the algorithms described above, we obtain a (k + 1/2)-round protocol with communications cost O(N + k), where k ≤ N . More concretely, the crs is comprised of 15 elements in G, the Sender's public key contains 5 elements in G, and each of the N ciphertexts in T requires 9 elements in G. Moreover, each item transfer involves transmission of 95 elements of G from Receiver to Sender, and then 46 elements of G from Sender to Receiver.
The message space of our OT protocol is elements in G, which will be sufficient for transferring a symmetric encryption key to unlock a file of arbitrary size.
D.3 Security Analysis
Theorem D.1 Instantiated with the above algorithms, OTA securely realizes the functionality F N ×1 OT in the F CRS -hybrid model under the q-Strong Decision Linear and uniform q-HSDH assumptions.
Let us now provide some intuition behind this proof. When either the Sender or the Receiver is corrupted, we wish to describe a simulator S such that it can interact with the ideal functionality F N ×1 OT (which we'll denote simply as F) and the environment Z appropriately; i.e., IDEAL F ,S,Z c
